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Foreword 
Kristen E. Boon∗ & Philip M. Moremen∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
This issue of the Seton Hall Law Review highlights contributions 
to When the Fighting Stops: Roles and Responsibilities in Post-Conflict Recon-
struction, a day-long Symposium held at Seton Hall University School 
of Law in the fall of 2007.1  The proceedings were dedicated to ana-
lyzing national and international efforts following conflict, primarily 
civil conflict, to create a stable and peaceful society and to prevent a 
recurrence of violence.2  Programs and policies on post-conflict re-
construction are thus intended to stabilize regions riven by conflict, 
restore law and order where possible, and transform the legal, politi-
cal, and economic order into a sustainable peace. 
Scholars and practitioners have employed various terms to de-
scribe efforts to perpetuate peace in societies following conflict, in-
 ∗ Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 ∗∗ Associate Professor, John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International 
Relations, Seton Hall University. 
 1 Symposium: When the Fighting Stops: Roles and Responsibilities in Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, Nov. 2, 2007, Seton Hall School of Law, Newark, New Jer-
sey.  Members of the Steering Committee for the Conference were, in addition to 
Professors Boon and Moremen, Professor Valerie Oosterveld, Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Western Ontario, and Professor Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Southern Methodist 
University Dedman School of Law.  The Steering Committee would like to thank the 
following individuals for their assistance and guidance: Donald Steinberg, Ian Johns-
tone, Ben Rowswell, Lawrence Moss, and Ambassadors John Menzies, Clay Constan-
tinou, and George Bruno.  The Steering Committee would also like to thank the fol-
lowing editors of the Seton Hall Law Review for their efforts in organizing the 
Symposium and this Symposium Issue of the Seton Hall Law Review: Randy Samson, 
Symposium Editor of Volume 38; David Simunovich, Editor-in-Chief of Volume 38; 
and Trevor Berrett, Editor-in-Chief of Volume 39. 
 2 This definition is adapted from Roland Paris’s definition of peacebuilding: “an 
activity that takes place in a post-civil war environment, the purpose of which is to 
create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace and to prevent the recurrence of 
large-scale violence.”  Alina Rocha Menocal & Kate Kilpatrick, Towards More Effective 
Peace Building: A Conversation with Roland Paris, 15 DEV. IN PRAC. 767, 767 (Nov. 2005). 
BOON (FINAL) 12/1/2008  11:36:28 AM 
1234 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1233 
 
cluding peacebuilding,3 nation-building,4 and post-conflict recon-
struction.5  Often, these terms are used casually, almost inter-
changeably.  But to some extent differences in vocabulary reflect dif-
ferences in ideology or differences in emphasis on the particular 
activities that should be included in post-conflict remediation.6  We 
do not take a rigid view of these definitional issues.  We use the term 
post-conflict reconstruction functionally to refer to the rebuilding of 
society following conflict involving efforts to provide and improve so-
cial and economic well-being, governance and participation, justice 
and reconciliation, and security.7  We choose the term in part be-
cause it emphasizes the role of authority, allocation of legal powers 
amongst states and international organizations, justice, and recon-
ciliation, which is the province of international law and international 
lawyers.8  The conference panels were designed to address four ques-
 3 See, e.g., MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR & BUILDING 
PEACE 22–23 (2006); Menocal & Kilpatrick, supra note 2, at 767. 
 4 See, e.g., JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., THE BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO NATION-BUILDING xvii 
(2007). 
 5 See William J. Durch & Tobias C. Berkman, Restoring and Maintaining Peace: 
What We Know So Far, in TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PEACE OPERATIONS 1, 9 (William J. 
Durch ed., 2006) (describing the lack of a consensus definition for peacebuilding 
and related terms). 
 6 See Michael Barnett et al., Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?, 13 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 35 (2007) (describing different usages for “peacebuilding” depending 
on the specific U.N. agency, international organization, or member state agency in-
volved); Charles T. Call & Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace: In-
ternational Responses to War-Torn Societies, 9 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 1, 3–4 (2008) (describ-
ing different definitions of “peacebuilding” and related terms). 
 7 See John J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan, Toward Postconflict Reconstruction, 
WASH. QTRLY, Autumn 2002, at 85, 89–90.  This definition was included in a report to 
U.S. policymakers sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) entitled Play to Win: Report of the 
Bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (2003), followed by a book that 
fleshed out the report’s recommendations, WINNING THE PEACE (Robert C. Orr ed., 
2004).  See Durch & Berkman, supra note 5, at 24.  Recent usage within the Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations appears to include the same elements.  See, e.g., 
U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations and Dep’t of Field Support, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 25 (2008) (citing Report of the Secre-
tary-General, No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or 
Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. Doc. S/2001/394 (Apr. 20, 
2001)) (sustainable peace requires security and public order, rule of law and respect 
for human rights, legitimate political institutions and participatory processes, social 
and economic recovery and development), available at http://pbpu. 
unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. 
 8 Indeed, some international legal scholars have focused on the development 
and content of a jus post-bellum, international law governing post-conflict situations.  
See Kristen E. Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Con-
temporary Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L.J. 285 (2005); Carsten Stahn, 
‘Jus ad Bellum,’ ‘Jus in Bello,’ ‘Jus Post Bellum’?: Rethinking the Conception of the Law of 
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tions on post-conflict reconstruction, discussed respectively in Parts 
II, III, IV, and V of this Foreword.  Who should be involved in post-
conflict reconstruction?  How should actors be coordinated, and 
where conflicts between the actors or their agendas arise, how should 
they be resolved?  What legal and ethical obligations bind those ac-
tors?  How do U.S. policies on post-conflict reconstruction comple-
ment or conflict with those of international institutions?  This last 
question is particularly relevant because since September 11, 2001, 
the United States has played an especially dominant role in post-
conflict reconstruction given the size, importance, and scope of its 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Finally, what lessons for the fu-
ture has the United States learned from its experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan?  Our discussion follows and relies on the insights of the 
Symposium’s panels and contributors. 
II. ACTORS 
A century ago, the actors involved in transitions between war and 
peace were limited.  Prior to the creation of the League of Nations, 
typically only colonial powers and the states directly affected were en-
gaged in the process.9  The landscape today is very different.  There 
are now a multitude of interested parties engaged in all aspects of 
peacebuilding, ranging from interested states to the United Nations 
and its agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs), including 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a 
wide variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
The reconstruction of Iraq illustrates the thick web of institu-
tions that assume a role in modern peacebuilding.  The United States 
and United Kingdom took on the lion’s share of the reconstruction 
responsibilities, given their initial involvement in the invasion, but 
other countries and organizations were involved throughout.  Japan, 
Kuwait, Spain, China, United Arab Emirates, Slovakia, the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the European Union all pledged funds at the 2003 
donor conference in Madrid.10  Moreover, international organiza-
tions played a major management role in the disbursement of the 
funds.11  In addition, eighty international and two-hundred national 
Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921 (2006); Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Discipline(s), 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 311 (2008). 
 9 RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION 47 (2008). 
 10 Ester Pan, Iraq: Madrid Donor Conference, BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 30, 2003, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7682/. 
 11 The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) was launched 
in 2004 by the United Nations and the World Bank to manage the funds raised and 
to help donor nations channel their resources and coordinate their support for re-
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NGOs have been involved in the reconstruction on the ground, creat-
ing a third layer of institutions, policies, and activities. 
The great number of actors who descend into the vacuum of a 
post-conflict situation face a number of challenges, including two of 
the most vexing.  First, whom do they represent?  The international 
community?  Their own constituencies?  The people of the country 
itself?  Answers to those questions necessarily inform each actor’s 
policies and agendas.  Second, must those actors promote certain 
principles such as equitable representation, democracy, or free 
speech, consistent with contemporary norms of human rights and go-
vernance? 
Issues of representation and ownership are taken up by Graciana 
del Castillo in her assessment of the IFIs’ role in post-conflict recon-
struction.12  The IMF, which helps countries to rebuild their capacity 
in the fiscal, monetary, and statistical areas, and the World Bank, 
which focuses on rebuilding the microeconomic foundations for in-
vestment, employment, and growth, have become important players 
in post-conflict economic reconstruction.13  Representation has be-
come an issue for the IFIs because, as del Castillo notes, the neutrality 
of the IMF has been challenged, particularly as it involves “owner-
ship” of market-based reforms.14  Countries with weak fiscal and high 
debt profiles, that have accepted aid and committed to extensive do-
mestic reform, have been the subject of particular criticism because 
the funds have been used as leverage to exact considerable and some-
times detrimental domestic institutional and legal changes.15
Julie Mertus’s discussion of the participation of women in the 
operation of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) provides further insights on the issue of represen-
construction and development in Iraq.  The Facility has two trust funds for donor 
contributions, each with its own characteristics and procedures: The World Bank 
Iraq Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank Group, and The United Nations 
Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund(ITF) administered by the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) on behalf of itself and Participating United 
Nations Organizations.  See World Bank Iraq Trust Fund, http://www.irffi.org/WB 
SITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,contentMDK:20241701~hlPK:537994~menuPK:6416862
0~pagePK:64168627~piPK:64167475~theSitePK:491458,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 
2008). 
 12 Graciana del Castillo, From War to Peace: The Development–Plus Challenge of Recon-
struction and the Role of the International Financial Institutions, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1265 (2008). 
 13 Id. at 1276. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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tation in international organizations.16  From her perspective, not 
only must international organizations achieve gender integration, but 
“an international criminal court functions better when women are 
included in all roles and levels.”17  In general, Mertus opposes sim-
plistic prescriptions for the inclusion of women in transitional justice, 
which she characterizes as the “add woman and stir” approach.18  
Nevertheless, in her study of the ICTY, she found that the participa-
tion of women made a clear and positive contribution.  The participa-
tion of women in all aspects of the ICTY’s creation and operation 
positively affected the inclusion and valuing of women witnesses and 
the development of wartime rape and sexual violence as crimes un-
der international law.  Moreover, the experience of women at the 
ICTY raised the bar for participation and gender expertise among the 
staff of criminal tribunals.19
III. COORDINATION 
The second theme addressed at the conference was coordina-
tion.  Coordination in the peacebuilding context includes not only 
coordination between categories of actors—states, intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), and NGOs—but also internal coordination 
within institutional bureaucracies.20
In its most basic sense, coordination involves dividing the tasks at 
hand and developing processes for determining appropriate goals.21  
In a deeper sense, coordination necessarily implies prioritization—in 
other words, deciding on the most important tasks and goals.22  When 
 16 Julie Mertus, When Adding Women Matters: Women’s Participation in the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1297 
(2008). 
 17 Id. at 1324. 
 18 Id. at 1298. 
 19 Id. at 1324. 
 20 For a discussion of coordination problems regarding peacebuilding among 
U.N. agencies, see Susanna P. Campbell, (Dis)integration, Incoherence and Complexity in 
UN Post-conflict Interventions, 15 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 556, 559–560 (2008) (applying a 
bureaucratic politics perspective).  See also generally MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA 
FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL 
POLITICS (2004) (developing a model of bureaucratic politics and applying it to in-
ternational organizations, including the U.N. peacekeeping bureaucracy). 
 21 See Simon Chesterman, From State Failure to State-Building: Problems and Prospects 
for a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 155, 171 (2005) 
(identifying problems of coordination arising at three levels: the strategic level, the 
operational level within countries, and the national level). 
 22 See Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Di-
lemmas of Postwar Statebuilding 6 (Nov. 2007) (Paper for the Int’l Peace Academy) 
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actors have different priorities, or perspectives on priorities, the re-
sult is not a matter of simple coordination but of contestation, of dis-
pute, of politics.23  The use of the term “coordination” masks this re-
ality24 and requires an investigation into how post-conflict 
reconstruction should be sequenced. 
A key new player in the coordination of post-conflict activities is 
the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).  Rob Jenkins’s Essay in this 
Symposium issue explores the effectiveness of the PBC in accomplish-
ing this goal.25  The intended purpose of the PBC was not to prevent 
conflicts but to coordinate the efforts of actors in post-conflict recon-
struction, direct attention to post-conflict countries, and marshal ad-
ditional resources for post-conflict countries.26  The primary impetus 
behind the PBC’s creation was the perceived need for cooperation 
and coordination between the United Nations, relevant U.N. agen-
cies, the IFIs, and other international actors.27
A joint resolution of the Security Council and the General As-
sembly established the PBC in late 2005.28  The PBC consists of repre-
(making a similar distinction), available at http://www.statebuilding.org/resources/ 
RPPS_report.pdf. 
 23 On a related point, Rob Jenkins notes, in his Article for this Symposium, 
[I]t is not until U.N. reforms are formally in place—that is, only after 
an institution has been restructured, or a policy premise revised—that 
the most intense phase of contestation begins.  Member-states, U.N. 
agencies, Secretariat departments, insider [NGOs], the various U.N. 
Councils and Commissions—each seeks to steer the new structures to 
its own purposes . . . .  
Rob Jenkins, Organizational Change and Institutional Survival: The Case of the U.N. Peace-
building Commission, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1327, 1333 (2008). 
 24 See id. at 1329 n.11.  See also Paris & Sisk, supra note 22, at 6 (Efforts to improve 
coordination can serve as a substitute for achieving substantive cooperation, by focus-
ing on process and away from substantive and strategic challenges.). 
 25 Jenkins, supra note 23. 
 26 See S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. SS/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005); G.A. Res. 60/80, ¶ 
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/80 (Dec. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Joint Resolution]; Carsten 
Stahn, Institutionalizing Brahimi’s Light Footprint: A Comment on the PBC’s Role and Man-
date, 2 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 403, 406 (2005). 
 27 See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1328–30 (Coordination among actors was clearly 
the main goal, allowing the achievement of the other secondary goals.); Boon, supra 
note 8, at 522 (creation of PBC resulted from calls for cooperation between the 
United Nations and IFIs).  Additional motivations included the lack of coordination 
within the United Nations, the lack of international attention to post-conflict coun-
tries, and the lack of financing for reconstruction efforts.  See U.N. High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Changes, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility , 
&& 224–30 (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.  See also NYU 
Ctr. on Int’l Cooperation and Int’l Peace Inst., Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strate-
gic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission 11 (2008) [hereinafter Taking Stock], available 
at http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/305/PBCsrev08.pdf. 
 28 See Joint Resolution, supra note 26. 
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sentatives from thirty-one member states29 drawn from various stake-
holder groups within the membership of the United Nations.30  The 
PBC is supported by a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a 
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), both under the authority of the Secretary 
General.31  The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) provides funding for 
peacebuilding activities in the short-term.32  The PBSO has three 
functions: to support the PBC, manage the IMF, and assist the Secre-
tary General in bringing together peacebuilding actors in the U.N. 
system.33
The PBC has a hard row to hoe in improving coordination with 
other actors, given the number and variety of organizations and states 
involved in peacebuilding.  Within the United Nations, the PBC must 
coordinate actions and policy with other member states, with other 
U.N. organs, and with the U.N. bureaucracy.  Outside of the United 
Nations, the PBC must coordinate with the IFIs, civil society partici-
pants clamoring for a seat at the table, and states that are not mem-
bers of the PBC, which often includes host states. 
The PBC has little coercive power.  As Jenkins points out, the 
PBC’s interstate character means that the PBC has no executive au-
thority and, thus, cannot direct or control U.N. agencies,34 let alone 
other IGOs or states.  The PBC was designed as an interstate body 
precisely so that states could retain as much control over peacebuild-
ing strategy as possible and so that the PBC would have a limited op-
erational capacity and, hence, limited effect.35
Because the PBC consists of members of the various stakeholder 
groups of states, moreover, the conflicts between those states tend to 
replicate themselves in the PBC.  Most notable are tensions between 
 29 Seven members come from the Security Council, seven from the General As-
sembly, seven from the Economic and Social Council, five from among the top ten 
troop-contributing countries, and five from among the top ten donor countries.  See 
id. ¶ 4. 
 30 See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1334. 
 31 See Joint Resolution, supra note 26, ¶¶ 23–24. 
 32 The IMF is not institutionally linked to the PBC but instead operates under the 
Secretary General.  The PBC can request the Secretary General to allocate monies 
from the IMF to countries on its agenda, as it did with Burundi and Sierra Leone.  See 
Security Council Report, Special Research Report: Peacebuilding Commission, Oct. 5. 2007, 
at 2, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Research%20Report_PBC%205%20Oct%2007.pdf 
 33 See id. 
 34 Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1328. 
 35 See Stahn, supra note 26, at 407, 411 (arguing that its “low profile” design is 
consistent with U.N. advocacy and restraint on peacebuilding issues generally); Ches-
terman, supra note 21, at 169–70 (describing reduction in scope and design for PBC 
from original proposal because of pressure from states). 
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the North and the South and related tensions between member states 
of the Security Council and member states of the General Assembly. 36  
Both sets of tensions generally involve a conflict between those who 
favor security interests and those who favor development.  Difficulties 
in coordination also exist between the PBC, on the one hand, and 
the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, on the other.  
Members of the Security Council and the General Assembly have 
complained about the lack of communication and information com-
ing from the PBC.37
 An important area of PBC activity has been the development of 
peacebuilding strategies for the countries on its agenda.38  Burundi 
and Sierra Leone were the first countries to be placed on the PBC’s 
agenda, followed by Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic.  
The essential idea behind the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies 
(IPBSs) is to develop a common approach to reconstruction, en-
dorsed by the relevant national government, local civil society, the 
IFIs, and other outside donors.39  According to Jenkins, the IPBSs for 
Burundi and Sierra Leone have had, at best, a mixed success to 
date.40  For one thing, the IPBS largely replicates various existing 
planning processes and documents.41  Nevertheless, Jenkins states, 
there are suggestions that the PBC and the IPBS process have had 
 36 See Jenkins, supra, note 23, at 1331; Taking Stock, supra note 27, at 5 (The role of 
the Organizational Committee “has been clouded by its use as a proxy in the ongo-
ing battle over the balance of power between the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.”). 
 37 See, e.g., U.N. SC, 62nd year, 5761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5761 (provisional) 
(Oct. 17, 2007) (containing both speeches of representatives regarding post-conflict 
peacebuilding and remarks of Russian and U.K. representatives); U.N. Dept. of Pub-
lic Information, General Assembly Debates Reform on Peacebuilding Commission’s First Year; 
Speakers Cite Promising Start, Call for Maximum Impact on the Ground, U.N. Doc. 
GA/10635, (Oct. 10, 2007) (reporting on 62nd General Assembly Plenary, remarks 
of German representative), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ 
ga10635.doc.htm. 
 38 The PBC’s founding resolutions called for the development of peacebuilding 
strategies in general terms.  See Joint Resolution, supra note 26, ¶ 2(b). 
 39 See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1331; Taking Stock, supra note 27, at 13. 
 40 See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1331. 
 41 See id.  The most significant of these is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PSRP), required by the IFIs, which governments must satisfy to be eligible for con-
cessional lending or debt-relief.  See id. at 1343.  Because the IPBS process is duplica-
tive, there is evidence that it has led to “strategy fatigue” on the part of national par-
ticipants.  See Taking Stock, supra note 27, at 15 (describing experience in Sierra 
Leone).  On occasion, the process may have overtaxed domestic capacity.  See Secu-
rity Council Report, supra note 32, at 6–7 (creation of the strategic framework in Bu-
rundi put strain on U.N. Country Team and on government, leading to a decision by 
the PBC to accept an incomplete framework and defer work on monitoring mecha-
nisms, which was later completed). 
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some effect at the margins in these countries in changing the mix in 
priorities between economic and policy goals.42
 The PBC has also managed to provide openings for developing 
countries, some donor governments, and some U.N. staff to contest 
the influence of the IFIs over national development planning.43  
While these successes are “minor,” they have, says Jenkins, demon-
strated the PBC’s ability to create an institutional niche, which bodes 
well for its survival.44  Thus, these successes could presage the ability 
of the PBC to establish itself and eventually effect real policy change.  
From an international legal perspective, institutional processes have 
the potential to alter policy by coercing participants to take account 
of the preferences of others, and by requiring them to justify publicly 
their own preferences.45  Process, therefore, has the potential to gen-
erate substantive results. 
At least one other set of commentators has identified additional, 
broader successes.  The PBC’s efforts in Burundi and Sierra Leone 
may have led to sustained international attention46 which contributed 
to a peaceful election in Sierra Leone.47  Furthermore, the IPBS proc-
ess, in addition to resolving some tensions between financial and po-
litical aspects of peacebuilding, may create consensus among actors 
on priorities.  As such, these commentators assert, it could serve as a 
means for making actors (such as donors) accountable for meeting 
their commitments.48  The prospect of using the IPBS as an account-
ability tool, however, runs up against the inherent limitations of the 
PBC that Jenkins identifies: lack of executive authority and limited 
operational capability.49  It remains to be seen whether bureaucratic 
nimbleness can overcome these significant stumbling blocks. 
Coordination leads to a second inquiry: what should the priori-
ties be among the different goals in post-conflict reconstruction, 
which include social and economic well-being, governance and par-
ticipation, justice and reconciliation, and security?  Two primary con-
flicts are between long-term economic development and security, and 
justice and security. 
 42 See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1346. 
 43 See id. at 1339, 1344. 
 44 See id. at 1332. 
 45 See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968).  See also 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale. L.J. 2599, 
2618–20 (1997) (describing the international legal process school). 
 46 See Taking Stock, supra note 27, at 3, 16. 
 47 See id. at 16. 
 48 See id. at 4. 
 49 See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 1328. 
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A. Economic and Social Well-Being Versus Security and Governance 
Both the IFIs and the United Nations play a role in post-conflict 
economic reconstruction.  The Security Council, by virtue of its 
Chapter VII powers, is responsible for peacebuilding generally.  The 
IFIs, in contrast, have become involved in providing assistance to 
fragile states in order to assist transitional countries to develop mod-
ern and coherent economic policies, and ensure the stability of the 
international economic system.  Accordingly, there is a need for co-
ordination and prioritization between the political preferences of the 
United Nations and the economic preferences of the IFIs. 
 Before the 1990s, the United Nations concerned itself with the 
politics of maintaining peace, rarely venturing into the economic 
realm.50  Similarly, the IFIs devoted their attention to economic stabil-
ity and long-term development assistance, and stayed away from the 
political tasks of reconstruction.51  In the 1990s, however, the IFIs be-
gan engaging in reconstruction efforts at the encouragement of the 
Clinton Administration, which recognized that the IFIs could be a 
source of financing and expertise “in all the nuts and bolts of nation-
building.”52  The Security Council, too, came to realize that successful 
post-conflict reconstruction necessarily required a greater focus on 
the economic policies and programs of recovering states.  The seeds 
of inter-institutional conflict were thus sown.53  The IFIs tend to pro-
mote liberal and market-oriented economic policies, whereas the 
United Nations tends to promote stability and security, respect for 
 50 For a discussion of the converging attention of the United Nations and the IFIs 
to economic matters in post-conflict reconstruction, see Kristen E. Boon, “Open for 
Business”: International Financial Institutions, Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule 
of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513, 519–26, 553–68 (2007). 
 51 Indeed, the IFIs were designed to be apolitical and were specifically enjoined 
from engaging in political affairs.  The World Bank’s Articles of Agreement state, 
“The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the mem-
ber or members concerned.  Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their 
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially. . . . ”  Int’l Bank for 
Reconstruction and Dev. Articles of Agreement, art. IV, § 10, opened for signature 
Dec. 27, 1945, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended Feb. 16., 1989,  
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-
articlesofagreement.pdf. 
 52 Boon, supra note 50, at 523 (quoting Sebastian Mallaby, It Pays for the U.S. to Go 
to the Bank, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2004, at B3). 
 53 This conflict between the IFIs and the U.N. specialized agencies, moreover, 
may just be a more recent skirmish in a long-running battle.  Jenkins points out that 
officials in the U.N. specialized agencies have long sought ways to counter the influ-
ence of the IFIs in overall national development planning.  Jenkins, supra note 23, at 
1342. 
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norms of human rights, and governance.  In the view of critics—
including representatives of developing countries and U.N. staff—
these market-based policies can cause social disruptions that under-
mine peace and security and the development of stable political insti-
tutions.54
 Graciana del Castillo, in her Essay in this Symposium issue, sup-
ports the critique of IFI market-oriented policies, at least when im-
plemented without regard for the difficulties post-conflict societies 
face.55  She argues that the immediate need for funding initiatives 
that support peace should take priority over policies that contribute 
to long-term economic development.  The IFIs have tended to treat 
post-conflict reconstruction like development as usual.  Post-conflict 
countries, however, must reconcile economic development, national 
reconciliation, and peace consolidation.  Accordingly, reconstruction 
may require short-term policies that distort the economy temporarily, 
and differ from policies that contribute to longer-term development.   
B. Justice and Reconciliation 
The justice and reconciliation aspect of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion includes the adoption of mechanisms to impose accountability 
for crimes and abuses that occurred during conflict.  It also involves 
the development of an effective and fair legal system that promotes 
the rule of law, which, at a minimum, requires functioning law en-
forcement systems, courts, and corrections institutions.56  An impar-
tial and effective administrative system must have procedures in place 
to combat corruption and manipulation,57 and promote transpar-
ency, predictability, and fairness in the promulgation of rules.58
Accountability mechanisms may contribute to peace in various 
ways.59  For example, accountability mechanisms draw a line between 
the past and the present, and signal the establishment of a new order.  
Ambassador Clint Williamson put this point another way in his key-
note speech, stating that failure to provide accountability undermines 
 54 See id. at 1341 (regarding this view among U.N. staff and academics); Boon, su-
pra note 50, at 550–51 (criticizing IFI market-oriented policies for their social costs, 
lack of legitimacy, and inconsistency with the value of self-determination). 
 55 del Castillo, supra note 12. 
 56 See Hamre & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 91. 
 57 See Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in Conflict Management, in LEASHING THE DOGS 
OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 401, 406–10 (Chester A. 
Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall eds., 2007). 
 58 See id. at 408–09. 
 59 See, e.g., id. at 410–13; David Mendeloff, Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postcon-
flict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 355, 358–61 (2004). 
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faith in the rule of law.60  Such mechanisms can provide victims with a 
sense of justice, putting grievances to rest instead of allowing them to 
smolder until fanned into the next conflict,61 and may, similarly, en-
courage reconciliation between peoples and groups.  These mecha-
nisms may promote democracy and educate the public about the 
past, preventing a return to conflict.  Ambassador Williamson empha-
sized that the removal of human rights violators from society is likely 
to improve the overall political dynamic in post-conflict societies.62  
There may be other reasons besides their contribution to peace, 
moreover, for adopting accountability mechanisms in post-conflict 
societies,63 including the pursuit of justice for its own sake and for the 
sake of victims’ families, and the deterrence of future human rights 
violations.64  In light of the peace-versus-justice debate,65 however, we 
 60 Clint Williamson, Keynote, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2008).  See also 
JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS: BUILDING 
THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTION 250 (2006) (accountability strength-
ens the rule of law by building the public’s confidence that they will be protected 
from predation, that disagreements can be resolved without resort to violence, and 
that legal and political institutions can protect rather than violate human rights). 
 61 See Williamson, supra note 60, at 1261 (regarding the importance of avoiding 
escalation). 
 62 See id. at 1255. 
 63 See Mendeloff, supra note 59, at 362 (suggesting that peace and other potential 
benefits of accountability mechanisms should be treated as analytically distinct). 
 64 See Williamson, supra note 60, at 1261 (regarding the deterrent effect of ac-
countability mechanisms). 
 65 A vast literature addresses accountability mechanisms, transitional justice, and 
the trade-off between peace and justice.  For a survey, see Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack 
Snyder, Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime Tribunals and 
Transitional Justice, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 345 (2004).  From the legal literature, see, 
e.g., ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
(Edel Hughes, William A. Schabas & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2007); MARK A. DRUMBL, 
ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN 
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998); POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (M. Cherif Bassiouni 
ed., 2002); STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 60; PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 
PEACE WITH JUSTICE?:  WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
(2002); Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, 
and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 
(2006); Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty, and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955 (2006); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice 
Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Ac-
counts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 
2537, 2542 (1991).  From the political science and policy literatures, see STEVEN D. 
ROPER & LILIAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2006); Truth V. 
JUSTICE (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000); GARY JONATHAN BASS, 
STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE (2000); Matteo Tondini, From Neo-Colonialism to a 
“Light-Footprint Approach”: Restoring Justice Systems, 15(2) INT’L PEACEKEEPING 237 
(2008); Louis Aucoin, Building the Rule of Law and Establishing Accountability for Atroci-
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might ask whether mechanisms for accountability are necessarily tied 
to the creation of an effective and fair legal system, consisting of law 
enforcement, courts, and corrections institutions.  These two ele-
ments are not necessarily linked; they are independent of each other, 
or at least not completely dependent.66  It is entirely possible to create 
a legal system based on the rule of law that contributes to the crea-
tion of a stable society, and does not incorporate a retrospective ac-
countability mechanism.  Several post-conflict societies have done just 
that, including post-Franco Spain, Namibia, and Mozambique.67  
Moreover, plenty of stable, otherwise peaceful regimes continue to 
exist in spite of their lackluster human rights records.68  One empiri-
cal study has found little support for the claim that successful peace-
building requires accountability mechanisms.69
In addition, the potential benefits also must be weighed against 
the potential for an accountability mechanism to disrupt, or under-
mine, progress toward a stable peace, at least in the short-term.  Pro-
viding accountability may stir up old animosities that might better be 
left undisturbed.  Accountability mechanisms could easily ensnare 
leaders of one side or the other, leaders who are essential players in 
the peace process and whose prosecution could inspire reaction from 
their followers.70
In considering the value of accountability mechanisms, we 
should distinguish between the short-term and the long-term devel-
opment of peace.71  One argument in favor of the proposition that 
ties in the Aftermath of Conflict, 8 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL & INT’L REL. 33 (2007); Mendeloff, 
supra note 59; Tonya L. Putnam, Human Rights and Sustainable Peace, in ENDING CIVIL 
WARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS 237, 239 (Stephen John Stedman 
et al. eds., 2002). 
 66 See generally Mendeloff, supra note 59 (questioning the causal links and assump-
tions supporting the idea that accountability—“truth-telling”—is necessary to con-
solidate peace following civil war). 
 67 See id. at 367. 
 68 See Putnam, supra note 65, at 239 (“Examples abound, both historically and in 
the present day, of stable governmental regimes with very poor human rights re-
cords.”). 
 69 See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Erros: Principles and Pragmatism in 
Strategies of International Justice, 28(3) INT’L SECURITY 5, 19–20 (2003/04) (finding that 
trials end abuses only when spoiler groups are weak and domestic legal infrastructure 
is reasonably well-established; that the capacity of truth commissions to promote rec-
onciliation is more limited than proponents claim, that amnesties can help contrib-
ute to peace). 
 70 But see Williamson, supra note 60, at 1255 (arrest of spoilers in Eastern Croatia 
and Bosnia did not lead to armed retaliation against NATO forces). 
 71 See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 69, at 241; Mendeloff, supra note 59, at 356, 
362; but see Williamson, supra note 60, at 1261 (discussing the importance of dealing 
with past grievances for both short-term and long-term stabilization). 
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accountability mechanisms contribute to peace relies on the democ-
ratic peace theory: accountability mechanisms contribute to the 
growth of a democratic society, and democratic societies tend to be 
peaceful societies.  Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that so-
cieties in the process of transition to democracy are more prone than 
mature stable democracies to conflict, both international and civil.72  
Furthermore, societies emerging from conflict are fragile, and small 
shocks can have a disproportionate impact.  In some cases, therefore, 
it may be important to find mechanisms that are less disruptive to 
prospects for peace.  As William Burke-White put it during the Sym-
posium, options exist for institutional design.73  Peace and reconcilia-
tion commissions are alternatives to criminal models; the timing of 
adopting accountability measures can be flexible (whether they are 
implemented immediately following the conflict or in the long-term); 
and finally there are choices with regard to the composition of courts, 
whether domestic, hybrid, or international.  In Bosnia, for example, 
the population was not ready after Dayton for a national accountabil-
ity mechanism, but now the ICTY is handing some of its cases over to 
a new State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,74 a domestic court with 
war crimes jurisdiction.75
IV. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
The roles played by international actors in post-conflict recon-
struction are varied; it is common for countries emerging from con-
flict to have poorly functioning governmental institutions or for sig-
nificant legitimacy problems to arise.  As a consequence, states may 
be unable to control or coordinate the international processes for re-
construction.76  In some instances, international institutions have 
 72 See generally Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Turbulent Transitions: Why 
Emerging Democracies Go to War, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IN A DIVIDED WORLD 161 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall 
eds., 2007). 
 73 See William Burke-White, Address at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: 
When the Fighting Stops: Roles and Responsibilities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
(Nov. 2, 2007).  See also DRUMBL, supra note 65 (suggesting alternatives to the crimi-
nal model, including local, bottom-up approaches and diversification of methods to 
include truth commissions and other mechanisms). 
 74 See Burke-White, supra note 73. 
 75 See generally William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International 
Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279 
(2008). 
 76 Bruce D. Jones, Strategic Coordination of International Engagement, in IRAQ: 
PREVENTING A NEW GENERATION OF CONFLICT 278 (Markus E. Bouillon et al. eds., 
2007). 
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taken on significant responsibilities, actually displacing government 
authority, as they did in Kosovo and East Timor.77  In other instances, 
they have created less intrusive regimes, such as the “light footprint” 
model in Afghanistan.78  Another category of intervention involves a 
formal occupation of territory, such as the United States and United 
Kingdom’s occupation of Iraq.  This spectrum of roles and responsi-
bilities raises hard legal questions for actors in post-conflict recon-
struction.  What is the legal relationship between the occupiers or in-
ternational actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction and the 
inhabitants of the territory?  Are institutions with governance func-
tions responsible only to their own members and mandates, or do 
they have attenuated fiduciary duties to the inhabitants? 
It is generally accepted that actors engaged in governance func-
tions in post-conflict reconstruction have fiduciary-like duties to the 
occupants.79  This is because control over the administration of the 
territory and allocation of resources leaves local populations vulner-
able to the risk of misconduct.  The “sacred trust” inherent in inter-
nationally administered mandate systems required member states to 
promote political, economic, social, cultural, and educational well-
being.  This history informs contemporary legal norms: peacebuilders 
and international administrators exercising public authorities must 
act in the best interests of local inhabitants.80  Similar obligations are 
implied in the Geneva Conventions: occupying powers are required 
to assume onerous responsibilities for the welfare of the occupied 
population, they are required to take all steps in their power to fur-
ther public order and safety, and they are usufructs in the manage-
ment of public property.81
 77 Boon, supra note 8, at 312–13. 
 78 SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU THE PEOPLE 88 (2005). 
 79 Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Anarchy Rules: Saving Failed States, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1992–1993, at 89. 
 80 As Greg Fox notes, however, this association is suspect because the mandate 
systems were governed only for outsiders.  The occupants were of little concern.  
When the goals of trusteeship became self-determination, during the decolonization 
movement of the 1960s, a shift occurred, which resulted in post–Cold War missions 
that put the interests of insiders at the forefront.  See Gregory H. Fox, HUMANITARIAN 
OCCUPATION 29 (2008). 
 81 Boon, supra note 8, at 304.  The Security Council and the CPA reaffirmed and 
expanded these trusteeship duties during the occupation of Iraq, reaffirming the 
currency of these concepts.  The Security Council required the Coalition Provisional 
Authority to “promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective admini-
stration of the territory.”  S.C. Res 1483, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).  
CPA Order No. 2 stated that all assets of the Iraqi Baath Party that had been trans-
ferred or acquired were subject to seizure by the CPA “on behalf, and for the benefit 
of the people of Iraq.”  Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 2, CPA/ORD/02, 
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Post-conflict reconstruction can create fundamental conflicts of 
interest for international actors in that the “best interests” of the in-
habitants of post-conflict zones may be irreconcilable with the inter-
ests of the major international stakeholders.82  After all, international 
organizations have a duty to fulfill their mandates, and an institution 
such as the IMF might decide it must insist upon structural reforms 
and tight monetary policies that protect major industrialized coun-
tries, even if this brings about severe consequences in the recipient 
country.  On the other hand, if the objective of multilateral economic 
reconstruction is to create a basis for sustainable self-government, IFI 
objectives must be altered to correspond to the people’s right to self-
determination.  An attenuated fiduciary-like duty should therefore 
prevail, such that an institution’s obligations to other constituencies 
such as stakeholders and markets are relaxed in favor of the inhabi-
tants’ protection.83
VI. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Two predominant lessons have resulted from the U.S. experi-
ence in Iraq and Afghanistan.84  First, a significant relationship exists 
between the level of inputs and the quality of output: higher or lower 
levels of effort, including levels of military manpower and economic 
assistance, will affect success or failure.  Post-conflict reconstruction 
cannot be done successfully on the cheap.  Second, the role of 
neighboring states is crucial, so that engaging with them is necessary, 
even if the United States otherwise is not favorable to them.  Put dif-
ferently, opposition from neighboring countries will doom a recon-
struction exercise because neighboring countries have too much ac-
cess, influence, and incentive to interfere. 
The United States has taken steps to improve its capacity in post-
conflict reconstruction.  In 2004, the United States established within 
the State Department the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruc-
tion and Stabilization (S/CRS), whose primary function is to coordi-
nate and develop civilian government capacity to address post-
May 23, 2003, available at http://www.casi.org.uk/info/cpa/030523-CPA-Order2.pdf.  
Furthermore, the management schemes implemented by the Council to oversee 
Iraqi Oil reinforced the Iraqi peoples right of national sovereignty over natural re-
sources, and confirmed that occupiers cannot prejudice the substantive rights of 
statehood. 
 82 See Boon, supra note 50, at 574. 
 83 Id. at 575. 
 84 See James Dobbins, Address at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: When 
the Fighting Stops: Roles and Responsibilities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Nov. 
2, 2007). 
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conflict situations.85  Two Symposium participants have served or are 
serving as head of S/CRS: Ambassador Clint Williamson played in a 
significant role in the creation of S/CRS,86 serving as its first Coordi-
nator, and Ambassador John Herbst serves as the current coordina-
tor. 
S/CRS has led the development of an interagency management 
system to prepare a plan of operations to coordinate the actions of 
U.S. civilian agencies, along with the military, in a stabilization crisis.  
More significantly, the agency is developing a Civilian Response 
Corps, consisting of civilian experts who can deploy to aid in post-
conflict situations in areas such as engineering, public administra-
tion, rule of law, and economics.87  A portion of these experts would 
be dedicated, permanent employees from various agencies, a larger 
group would consist of permanent government employees on 
standby, and others would be members of a civilian reserve corps, 
which would operate like the reserves in the military.  Eventually, the 
corps would consist of 2250 experts, plus the civilian reserve.  As of 
July 2008, however, this initiative has been only partially funded and 
awaits further Congressional authorization.88
While this effort is laudable, one may question whether its scope 
and size is adequate, especially as Congress has, so far, failed to fully 
fund it.  Furthermore, it is surprising that a nation with so much ex-
perience in nation-building should have been so ill-prepared for the 
rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, finding itself in the posi-
tion of playing catch-up.  As James Dobbins points out, by 2003 there 
was no country in the world with more experience in nation-building 
than the United States.  During the Cold War, the United States in-
vaded a new country every ten years and in the 1990s participated in a 
new nation-building exercise every two years, while also supporting 
 85 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabi-
lization, http://www.state.gov/s/crs/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2008). 
 86 See Williamson, supra note 60, at 1259–61 (describing role in establishing 
S/CRS). 
 87 See Press Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Civilian 
Response Corps of the United States of America (July 16, 2008) [hereinafter Civilian 
Response Corp], available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/07/ 
107063.htm.  The Civilian Response Corps was officially rolled out on July 16, 2008.  
Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Civilian Response 
Corps Rollout (July 16, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 
2008/07/107083.htm. 
 88 See Civilian Response Corp, supra note 87 (launch of the corps made possible 
by a $75 million supplemental appropriation; President requested funding to expand 
the corps for the 2009 fiscal year). 
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U.N. operations.89  At the end of the 1990s, the United States willfully 
jettisoned this experience, because of a new administration deter-
mined to avoid nation-building, perhaps because Congress and the 
voters were unwilling to pay for it. 
The second lesson—that the United States must engage with 
neighboring countries in its post-conflict efforts—returns us to the 
intersection of security and justice issues.  Simply put, sometimes the 
neighbors will not be cooperative.  Some neighboring countries will 
have regimes hostile to the United States (Iran and Syria, for exam-
ple) or will have atrocious human rights records (Syria and Pakistan, 
for example).  Some people may counsel that the United States 
should not engage with either type of regime: the United States 
should isolate both hostile regimes and human rights violators as a 
means of forcing them to change.  Surely, however, if anything can 
be learned from the last few years of U.S. foreign policy, it is that non-
engagement usually is not productive, and may even be counter-
productive.  In the post-conflict context, moreover, non-engagement 
with neighboring countries is likely to result not simply in a frustrated 
peacebuilding effort but also in the loss of many lives and the un-
dermining of a potentially stable society. 
As the only superpower, the participation of the United States in 
post-conflict reconstruction can have an outsized effect in particular 
cases, and U.S. policies and goals may very well conflict with the poli-
cies and goals of other actors.  Where the United States perceives its 
interests as paramount and where the United States has committed 
significant resources, the United States will seek to dominate the 
agenda, for good or ill.  This domination is particularly evident in 
Iraq, where the United States permitted only a limited role for the 
United Nations and other countries.  At times in Iraq, the feeling was 
reciprocal: other international actors were not sure they wanted to 
share the effort, and the blame, with the United States.90  Certainly, 
however, U.S. policy in Iraq did not correspond with the preferences 
of much of the international community. 
Yet in other situations, U.S. policy and goals may coincide with 
those of the United Nations and other states, or the United States 
and the international community may reach a modus vivendi.  First, 
some missions may be possible only where a powerful state or a re-
gional organization takes the lead.  Some missions may require the 
use of overwhelming force, and the United Nations “does not do in-
 89 Dobbins, supra note 84.  See also DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 4, at xvii. 
 90 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 76, at 277, 293. 
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vasions.”91  In these cases, a primary role for the United States may be 
necessary, with the expectation from all parties that the United States 
will play a lead role.  Second, there are operations where the U.S. 
role is more integrated into a broader international effort, such as in 
Kosovo.  Finally, in some operations, the U.S. role is minimal or non-
existent.  Even in these operations, U.S. material or political support 
may contribute to the success of a mission. 
Accordingly, in reality there often seems to be a tradeoff be-
tween the extent of a U.S. role in particular missions and the degree 
of U.S. control.  The question may legitimately be raised whether 
greater U.S. participation entitles the United States to greater weight.  
After all, the United Nations acts on behalf of all its members, not 
just as an adjunct to one great power.  In addition, the dominant role 
of the United States may taint the legitimacy of a mission under an 
international umbrella. 
But it is precisely the legitimacy umbrella of the United Nations 
and other international organizations that gives those organizations 
some leverage in relations with the United States.92  The United 
States simply does not possess the legitimacy of the United Nations or 
its reputation for even-handedness; consequently, the United States 
needs international organizations, both for missions it cannot under-
take and even for missions in which it participates.  Even in Iraq, it 
became clear that the United States needed international partners to 
increase the legitimacy of the peacebuilding effort, for example, turn-
ing to the United Nations to assist in the establishment of an interim 
authority and the operation of elections.93
In addition, the United Nations provides the most appropriate 
vehicle for the majority of peacebuilding missions.  United Nations 
peace missions operate at comparably low cost, boast a comparatively 
high rate of success, and possess that intangible benefit of compara-
tive legitimacy.94  The number of U.N. successes95 far outweighs the 
few well-publicized failures, demonstrating the continuing value of 
U.N. peace operations in particular, and peace operations in general. 
 91 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 4, at xxi. 
 92 Boon, supra note 50, at 549. 
 93 See, e.g., Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
L. 1, 61–67 (2006). 
 94 See DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 4, at xxi. 
 95 Successful U.N. peacebuilding operations include Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia 
(debatable), Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.  See id. at 
vi. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Because of the number of domestic and international actors en-
gaged in post-conflict reconstruction, coordination is necessary, even 
among different agencies within states.  But coordination—avoiding 
duplication, trying not to step on one another’s toes—is not suffi-
cient.  To maximize the benefits of joint action, it is also necessary to 
prioritize among different goals.  Prioritization, however, is rendered 
extremely difficult by the horizontal nature of international relations, 
by the sovereign nature of states, by the separate identity and inde-
pendence of the international organizations they create, and even by 
the independence of civil society members.  Prioritization is not sim-
ply a matter of coordination; it is a matter of contestation, of conflict 
between actors. 
Can institutions whose ostensible purpose is to coordinate 
among actors in this environment be successful?  The Symposium ex-
amined two such institutions, in both the international and the do-
mestic contexts: the PBC and S/CRS.  It seems that the odds are 
stacked against the PBC, and perhaps also against S/CRS, given the 
low level of resources the latter has attracted.  According to Jenkins, 
however, there are signs that the PBC has made some inroads in 
changing policies as they relate to the specific countries on the PBC 
agenda.96  These inroads may simply be marginal, of little lasting im-
portance, serving only to promote the survival of the PBC and its sub-
institutions as bureaucratic players.  Or, they may create openings for 
their institutions to make greater changes in the future. 
The priorities among the goals of post-conflict reconstruction—
security, economic well-being, justice and reconciliation, governance 
and participation—are not self-evident.  Policies which may promote 
long-term economic health may in the short-term compromise secu-
rity and the development of stable government institutions.  Simi-
larly, accountability mechanisms may also undermine short-term se-
curity interests, and vice-versa. It seems to us that, in many situations, 
significant security and stability interests should take priority in the 
immediate post-conflict period over other goals.  Without a secure 
environment, the other goals will be impossible to achieve in the 
short-term and in the long-term. 
 96 See generally Jenkins, supra note 23. 
